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The
intergroup dynamics of collective empowerment:
Substantiating
the social identity model of crowd behaviour
John
Drury
University
of Sussex
&
Steve
Reicher
University
of St. Andrews
Correspondence: John Drury, University of
Sussex, Sociology and Social Psychology Division, Social Sciences (Arts E),
Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN, East Sussex, UK.
Abstract
A number of
recent accounts of collective action point to the importance of psychological
empowerment, but conceptualize it merely as a precondition for such collective
action. By contrast, the social identity model (Reicher, 1996; Stott, 1996)
suggests that empowerment be considered as a product as well as a precondition
of collective action. However, previous research on the social identity model
has merely inferred the emergence of feelings of power theoretically rather
than shown it empirically. This paper describes an analysis of a town hall
anti-poll tax demonstration, using a variety of material, including interviews
with demonstrators, councillors and police. Consistent with the social identity
model, the analysis suggests that feelings of power emerged and increased
within the crowd event; these feelings were attributable to expectations of
support due to the more inclusive categorization among crowd members brought
about by their perceived wholesale illegitimate exclusion from the town hall.
Moreover, the empowered action of crowd members was limited by shared
definitions of proper practice.
Introduction
Psychological
research on collective action has recently become increasingly concerned with
the role of power. Subjective power has commonly been theorized in terms of the
concept of ‘efficacy’, which Chase (1992) defines as the (perceived) ability of
the individual to bring about a desired state of the world or to avert an
undesired state of the world. Klandermans (1992) points to the widespread
agreement among recent social movement theorists that collective protest takes
place in the belief among participants that the experienced grievances can be
eliminated by the challengers' collective action. A number of social
psychological studies have provided evidence to support this argument (Abrams,
1993; Breakwell, 1992; Cocking, 1995; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995).
Efficacy, whether group or
individual, is conceptualised as a dispositional characteristic which explains
who does or doesn't participate in collective action. By contrast there are
what may loosely be termed situational accounts of collective empowerment. Le
Bon's (1895) model of the crowd falls into this latter category. He argues
that, by virtue of being submerged in a mass of people, crowd members lose all
conscious sense of self and hence all rational control over their behaviour but
they gain a sense of invincible power. Ironically, the modern translation of
the submergence concept into deindividuation theory (e.g. Diener, 1977, 1980;
Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1982, 1983, 1989; Zimbardo, 1970) tend to retain
the notion of loss of self while tending to ignore the gain of empowerment (cf.
Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995).
By contrast, outside the field of
social psychology, resource mobilization approach theorists (e.g., Gamson,
1975; Gamson, Fireman & Rytina, 1982; McCarthy & Zald, 1977;
Oberschall, 1973) have argued that mass action brings about empowerment but
without engendering a descent into irrationality and loss of control. It is the
provision to individuals of organizational resources such as communication and
the ability to coordinate action which lies at the root of collective
empowerment. Within social psychology, the social identity model of crowd
action (Reicher, 1982, 1984, 1987; Reicher & Levine, 1994a,b; Reicher,
Levine & Gordijn, in press; Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995) also seeks
to retain the notion of collective empowerment while discarding the idea of
loss of selfhood in the mass. However, whereas resource mobilization theory
sees the self as staying constant in collective contexts, albeit with enhanced
resources to attain its goals, the key premise of the social identity model is
that the self is transformed by virtue of participation in collective action.
In the mass, personal identity
becomes less salient and people act in terms of that social identity which is
associated with the relevant social category. Control over behaviour is not
lost but rather governed by the understandings and values that define social
identity. However collective contexts don't just have cognitive implications in
terms of identity salience, they also have strategic consequences for the
expression of identity. By virtue of being both relatively anonymous to
outgroups and hence relatively immune from their sanctions but also visible to
ingroup members and hence able to coordinate with them, crowd members are
enabled to enact their collective values and understandings even in the face of
outgroup opposition. As Reicher, Spears & Postmes (1995) put it, far from
crowd action being uncontrolled, perhaps it is uniquely in the crowd that
people can fully express their social identities.
Following years in which social
psychology has ignored the issue of power (Cartwright, 1959; Dépret &
Fiske, 1993; Ng, 1980; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985; Tedeschi, 1974), the recent
turn to issues of empowerment in collective action and intergroup relations is
surely to be welcomed. Yet it is arguable that accounts of empowerment which
stress ‘efficacy’ or situational determinants are somewhat static. Either power
is a state that pre-exists collective action or else it is automatically and
fully in place as soon as the collective forms. In either case, there is no
consideration of the possibility that a sense of power develops in the course
of collective processes. However, documentary studies of social movements and
crowd events commonly point to the occurrence of empowerment not just as a
pre-condition, nor as a simple correlate of collective events, but also as an
outcome. For example, the ghetto rioters of the 1960s who felt their action
achieved something against a normally powerful outgroup subsequently felt
satisfaction, pride and confidence in their identity as participants -
personally as well as collectively (Boesel, Goldberg & Marx, 1971).
Similarly, commentators on the French events of May 1968 describe how occupying
students displayed increased confidence in their own abilities and capacities:
‘The occupants of Censier suddenly cease to be unconscious, passive objects shaped by particular
combinations of social forces; they become conscious, active subjects who begin to shape their own
social activity’ (Gregoire & Perlman, 1969, p. 37; emphasis in original).
While an account of the preconditions of empowered collective action is
necessary, this must not preclude an understanding of the emergence of
empowerment in the collective; indeed, ideally what needs to be shown is the
possible relations between these two aspects of power in collective action.
What is necessary, in other words, is an account of the dynamics of empowerment processes in crowd events.
Recently, the social identity model
has been elaborated precisely in order to account for developmental changes in
the course of crowd action (Reicher, 1996, 1997; Stott, 1996). The key to these
elaborations is the observation that crowd events are typically intergroup
encounters and therefore the position of any one party must be understood in
relation to the ongoing intergroup dynamic. In a number of studies (Reicher,
1996; Stott, 1996) it is shown how outgroup
power may serve to create the context within which crowd members define
themselves. In particular, where an outgroup are seen to act against all
participants as if they were the same, this creates conditions under which
those participants are likely to define themselves in terms of a single all
inclusive categorization. Moreover, where the outgroup action is experienced as
illegitimate, this creates conditions under which the inclusive ingroup will
sanction resistance against that action. What is more, outgroup action does not
simply provide the inclination for the ingroup to resist, it also provides the
means. Whereas, previously, the crowd may have been made up of a plethora of
smaller categories, each of which felt relatively powerless in the face of the
police presence, the formation of a single large category along with the
feelings of consensus and the expectations of mutual ingroup support that are
created by common categorization empowers the group to oppose the police.
While the elaborated social identity
model provides a theoretical basis for understanding the emergence of empowerment
in crowd events, and while the empirical studies show evidence of behavioural
shifts which are consonant with the argument that people come to be empowered
as a function of the enlarged ingroup category, there is virtually no direct
evidence to show that people do indeed become empowered in this way. There is
little material in their studies on crowd members' actual subjective feelings
of empowerment, and no material at all on the attributions of any such feelings
- whether to collective support or any other factor. All in all, the model of
empowerment is inferred rather than demonstrated.
The aims of the present study are
therefore threefold. First, and most generally, the aim is to examine whether
and the extent to which empowerment can arise from collective action. Second,
and more specifically, the study aims to investigate the impact of intergroup
actions in altering self-categorizations and hence power relations. The third
and final aim was related to the Le Bonian claim that power and loss of self
control go together in the crowd. The study therefore aims to investigate
whether crowd simply used their power to ‘do anything’ or whether (as the
social identity model would suggest) empowerment enabled crowd members to
express their shared identity - and hence meaningful limits to crowd action
remained in place. To these ends, a detailed study of empowerment processes in
a crowd event - an anti-poll tax demonstration at a town hall - was carried
out. At this demonstration, a council meeting was partially disrupted and a
crowd outside the building came into prolonged conflict with the police as they
tried to push their way past officers and into the chambers. The analysis
focuses on participants' feelings of empowerment and the possible factors contributing
to these feelings both during and after the incidents.
Methodological ISSUES
Selection of the event
There were two
main criteria for the selection of a crowd event for this study. First, the
issue of power had to be central to the actions of participants and to their
development. While power issues may be relevant to all crowd events, they will
be most clearly revealed in situations of constraint where at least one party
seeks to repress what at least one other seeks to do. Moreover, according to the
theoretical model we have outlined, the development of power relations depends
upon asymmetries in the way that different parties view what rights obtain in
the situation and what forms of action are legitimate. For the purposes of our
analysis, then, the event had to be contested.
Secondly, it was
necessary to choose an event in which we could collect the data necessary for
our analysis. This is not just an issue of access to subjects. In analysing
contested events where crowd members are doing things that are opposed by
police and local authorities and where the topic concerns acts that might be
censored by these authorities or even be illegal, it is necessary to have the
full trust of respondents. This is complicated by the fact that members of many
groups in protest have a generic distrust of academics who they see as
implicated in the system that is being opposed.
On these twin
grounds, we chose the protest against the setting of the poll tax by Exeter
City Council in March 1990. On the one hand, the event was clearly contested.
Indeed it was possibly the most intense collective confrontation which had
occurred in the city for many years. On the other hand, the researchers had
good contacts both amongst the protestors and amongst the councillors. On the
basis of these contacts a sizeable number of participants were prepared to
discuss their perspective and their actions in some detail.
Data sources
(a)
Participants' accounts Twenty-nine of the approximately 200
demonstrators were interviewed, including five of the 20 or so people who got
inside the town hall. Twenty of those interviewed were male, nine female. Ages
ranged from early 20s to 50s, with late 20s being the modal age. Interviewees
were an opportunity sample; over a period of around seven months, attempts were
made to contact everyone who was present at the demonstration. The local
anti-poll tax union initially supplied some names; each of these was asked if
they knew others who were present who might be willing to be interviewed. No-one
who was contacted refused to participate although in one case it was impossible
to find a time to organize an interview. Four of the interviews took place with
groups of two or three at a time. Such a group interview technique can be used
to reproduce the social relations through which individuals experienced
collective events. It may therefore not only aid memory for perceptions at the
time but also produce some of the identity-based actions (shouts, feelings
etc.) that occurred in the earlier context. (See Banks (1957) Burgess (1982)
and Reicher (1996) for discussions of group interviews.) The standard
interviewing technique was to show interviewees an edited version of the video
of the events. This video, taken by a protestor who was outside the council meeting,
was edited down from 60 minutes to 25 minutes for reasons of practicality. It
covered all the phases of the event from initial crowd formation to crowd
dispersal. The video both served as a further memory prompt, and was used as a
stimulus for the interview questions, using a semi-structured format. Finally,
all interviewees were shown a scrapbook of news cuttings about the event, and
asked to comment on the accounts. (See Whyte (1984, p. 106) and Thompson (1978,
p. 173) for use of a similar technique in interviewing.) Most of these
interviews lasted about an hour.
Fourteen of the councillors who
present at the meeting that evening were contacted. Seven of them agreed to be
interviewed, two of them together. Three of those interviewed were Conservatives
(including the then mayor), two were Labour members and two were Liberal
Democrats. An additional two provided written accounts. Of the remaining five,
one failed to reply and four were unavailable for interview for a variety of
reasons. As well as the councillors, five police officers were interviewed: a
superintendent , three constables and a sergeant. One of the two mace-sergeants
(town hall security/guides) on duty that evening was also interviewed. The
scrapbook was used on each occasion. However the video was only used when
interviewing the mace sergeant and the former mayor. In the other cases the
interviews were carried out, at the interviewees' request, in council or police
offices without access to a video player. These interviews each lasted about
half an hour.
The interview schedule for crowd
participants covered the following issues:[1] (i) background (e.g., ‘What was the poll tax issue all about?’);
(ii) nature of the crowd participants (e.g., ‘What kind of people were there?);
(iii) relationship with the rest of the crowd (e.g., ‘What did you think of the
rest of the crowd?’); (iv) the police (e.g., ‘What was your relationship like
with the police at the beginning? Physically, emotionally, socially.’); (v) the
council (e.g., ‘How did you see the council?’); (vi) aims and expectations
(e.g., ‘What did you hope to achieve?’); (vii) changes in behaviour (e.g., ‘At
what point did people start pushing to get into the town hall?’); (viii)
feelings of power (e.g., ‘Why did you feel able to do this (push and shove like
this) [if applicable]?’; (ix) feelings afterwards (e.g., ‘How did you feel
about the events afterwards?’). Versions of questions under these headings were
asked at different points during the showing of the video to grasp any changes in
participants' perceptions during the event. A similar schedule, with obvious
modifications, was employed for the interviews with police, councillors and the
mace sergeant.
Additionally, two demonstrators, two
councillors and a police officer provided written accounts using questionnaire
versions of the interview schedules.
All interviews were taped and
transcribed. All interviewees and those providing written accounts were
guaranteed anonymity. In the analysis, initials D = demonstrator and P = police
officer. The reference at the bottom of each excerpt of interview text is to
the date of the interview [dd-mm-yy]. Transcription conventions are based on
those in Parker (1992) and Potter & Wetherell (1987):
When material has been edited out of the transcript, it is signalled
with an empty pair of square brackets, thus [ ].
Where information has been supplied to the text, it is put in square
brackets [like this].
Where material is unclear or inaudible, empty round brackets are
used, like this ( ).
Where sound quality leads to doubts about the accuracy of material,
it is put in round brackets (like this).
(b) Video footage Video footage taken by one participant was
made available on request. The footage is of the crowd outside the town hall
and lasts about an hour, covering the period during which the crowd built up
until people started to drift away and the conflict ended.
(c) Newspaper accounts The analysis makes use of
accounts of the event in three local newspapers, plus a more detailed account
in an alternative publication (The Flying
Post), written by a demonstrator. All accounts include a number of pictures
of the event.
Analytic
procedure
In the first
place, a consensual account of the event was constructed, using different
sources (demonstrators, police and press) (cf. Denzin, 1989). The rationale for
constructing a consensual account is not only to guide the reader, but more
importantly to identify some of the patterns of behaviour that need to be
explained in the analysis proper: what were participants' feelings and
perceptions during behaviours identified in the consensual account? Moreover,
the extent to which the theoretical account offered on the basis of these
feelings and perceptions helps explain the evidence in the consensual account can
be taken as one index of its adequacy as an explanation (cf. Reicher, 1996).
Consensus was operationalized as
follows. If a claim was made by different sides (demonstrators on the one hand
and police, councillors, mace sergeants or press on the other), or was
supported by the video and at least one other source, and if nobody disputed
the claim, then it was considered consensual. Where accounts diverged or only
one source existed for a particular claim, references are given (in brackets).
The analysis proper is broadly in
the tradition of thematic analysis (cf. Kellehear, 1993). However, since the
rationale for the study is to explore the model provided by Reicher (1996) and
Stott (1996), analytic categories are based on previous work on social identity
and collective action rather than derived entirely ‘bottom up’ from the data
(cf. Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Material was read to identify: (i) any
reasons participants gave for their actions; (ii) any talk of the legitimacy or
otherwise of own or other's actions; (iii) any talk of feelings of power and/or
powerlessness at different times during the event; (iv) any perceptions the
various participants held of the crowd at different times during the event - in
particular of mutual support and unity (or lack of it).
An account of the
event
(a) Background to the protest: On Tuesday 6 March 1990, Exeter City Council met to set its
community charge or poll tax for the first time. The Conservative government
had introduced this new flat-rate local taxation scheme to replace rates, which
were based on property values. Although many Labour-run councils voiced
opposition to the tax (as in Exeter), none of them refused to set it. During
1989 and early 1990, a nationwide movement developed against the tax which critics
argued was regressive and therefore unfair; hundreds of local anti-poll tax
‘unions’ were formed across the country in an attempt to co-ordinate local
opposition to the tax and to encourage resistance through mass non-payment. In
the weeks previous to the Exeter demonstration, council poll tax rate-setting
meetings at town halls around the country had been met with protests, ranging
from demonstrations outside the buildings to disruption inside (Burns, 1992).
In Exeter, the local anti-poll tax union heard about the city council meeting
at short notice and publicized by word
of mouth, through street meetings in the city centre and by flyposting
throughout the city.
(b) The initial period - crowd formation: The meeting was due to begin at 6 p.m. At 5.15, a crowd of about
50 were already gathered outside the doors of the town hall in Exeter High
Street. A police public order van was stationed a few yards along the road. By
about 5.30, the crowd had swelled to around 100-150 people. Three police
officers stood at the door outside the building. Demonstrators at this stage
were mostly standing around chatting in small groups.
When the councillors started to
arrive there was some booing from the crowd and shouting of ‘Don’t pay’ (video). The crowd was
packed tightly round the door at this point and councillors had to pass amongst
the demonstrators to get into the building; people in the crowd spoke to the
councillors or shouted at them. Some councillors avoided the crowd by going in
at the back of the building. As the door closed on the councillors, the crowd
gathered round the doors, facing the entrance to the building (video). There
were shouts of ‘Let us in’, ‘Public meeting’ and other complaints.
Then the first sustained collective chanting began - ‘We won’t pay the poll tax’; most of the crowd faced the doors and
joined in (video). This was followed by other collective chants: ‘Can’t pay won’t pay’ and ‘They say poll tax we say fight back’.
Shortly afterwards, some demonstrators were let in. There is some disagreement
over the number (both within and between the groups of police, councillors and
demonstrators), with estimates ranging from ten to thirty. There is no dispute,
however, that those who went in were simply those nearest the front of the
crowd, and, more importantly, that the rest of the crowd voiced displeasure
that more were not let in.
(c) The middle period - conflict inside and outside
the town hall; Demonstrators in the public
gallery were quiet at first, but soon unfurled an anti-poll tax banner and
disrupted the chaplain’s prayer and the councillors' speeches with shouts and
heckles. The mayor called for order three times before suspending the meeting
and asking that the demonstrators be removed. At this point, a volley of food
was thrown by the demonstrators and struck some of the councillors[2]. The demonstrators then made their exit.
By this point the crowd outside
numbered about 200. The majority were close to the building facing the doors
(video). There was loud and sustained chanting of ‘Let us in, Poll tax out’ (video). There were two police public
order vans in the street by then, and the number of police on the door had
increased to seven (video). For a period, crowd members made sustained and
vigorous pushes against the doors. In the process, those police officers
standing in front of them were pressed up against both the doors and adjacent
railings. The pushing was accompanied by the chant ‘In In In’ (video). There were struggles between the police and
members of the crowd: the video shows crowd members shouting police numbers and
calling for help. It also shows heated arguments between police and crowd
members. A number of interviewees mentioned crowd members being rescued from
arrest by their fellows during this period. Some accounts on both sides
describe blows being exchanged. Glass was broken and demonstrators threw some
missiles, specifically eggs and flour, at the doors. Many accounts speak of
tempers being raised. However, most interviewees agreed with both the claim in The Flying Post that ‘there were more
helmets flying than fists, and the overall impression was of a lot of
ritualised pushing and shoving punctuated by the occasional angry outburst’
(April 1990, p. 13).
When the pushing became more
concerted outside, there were attempts by the demonstrators in the lobby to
open the doors to let people in. A number of accounts from both mace sergeants
and demonstrators agree that the doors nearly burst inwards with the force from
both sides. Some of the demonstrators inside then went upstairs into other
parts of the building. One of them set a fire alarm off. This was met with
cheers (video). All those inside were finally ejected through the backdoor of
the town hall.
(d) The final period - dispersal and
aftermath: A fire engine arrived in response to the alarm, blocking
traffic in the High Street. More police were stationed at the town hall
entrance (about ten altogether). While the fire officers consulted with the
police, the crowd spread about the area and became more relaxed - demonstrators
sat in the road or stood around chatting, and less faced the town hall doors.
However, shortly afterwards, demonstrators started chanting ‘Poll
tax out, Let us in’ again and people approached the doors once more
(video). The crowd had diminished by about 100, and there was a space now
between the police and the crowd (video). The council resumed its meeting,
meanwhile, and finally, just after 7.25pm, a council official announced to
those left outside that the council had set the tax (demonstrators). At this
point the demonstrators rapidly dispersed
The event made the front page of the
local newspaper the next day, and there were some accusations in the press of
‘travelling outsiders’ being behind what happened. All the demonstrators
interviewed scoffed at this, mostly saying instead that the crowd comprised a
heterogeneous group of local people. Some of those councillors who were
interviewed also commented that they recognized many of those present as local
people. The police tended to describe those active in the protest as
homogeneous (e.g., ‘lefties’) but local.
For reasons of
space, the analysis will focus only on the behaviours and experiences of the
largest section of the crowd: those outside, rather than inside, the town hall.
The analysis will examine: (i) whether and to what extent demonstrators felt
empowered during the event; (ii) features of the changing intergroup
relationship seen to be responsible for any such feelings of empowerment; and
(iii) any normative limits to behaviour within such empowerment. Accordingly,
the analysis is divided into three sub-sections.
Evidence of empowerment
(a) Feelings and perceptions: Some demonstrators said
that, during the early stages of the demonstration, the swelling numbers produced
in them a growing sense of power:
D10: As more and
more people got there there was a feeling of power and just feeling of erm
being able to have our say, you know, really.
[15-3-93]
Such comments increased in frequency
among interview responses when demonstrators were asked about their feelings
when the crowd was chanting and pushing at the town hall doors:
D23: Yeah, because
of the size of the crowd and the strength of feeling in the crowd, that we had
a certain solidarity there
[7-3-93]
However, it is clear that it
wasn't numbers per se that made demonstrators feel confident, but rather the
feeling of unity and hence the perceived support for their actions that such
numbers offered:
D22: It was a
feeling of a group of people acting together (the sort of thing) that very few
people there would have done on their own. I don’t know, a sort of crowd
consciousness, we could do this, we had some sort of power together to actually
do it, so we did
[21-5-93]
(b) Support for specific actions - pushing chanting
and resisting arrest: Some demonstrators explicitly mentioned the encouragement they
took from others' behaviour. They said that they began to shout or push because
they had gained the confidence to do so within the crowd; the fact that others
were already doing so made them feel supported in taking such action
themselves:
D21: There’s always
a certain amount of nervousness to start anything like that [chants or pushing]
until you’re absolutely sure you’ve got enough people there that are also into
it
Int: Right You felt
that you felt that during this, did you?
D21: Oh definitely
there was enough people to be into it during this
[24-2-93]
Moreover, this support took the form
not simply of co-action, but also of verbal encouragement by others who were
not necessarily themselves joining in:
Int: When you were
pushing how many people were joining in did it seem like most people or
D22: Oh about two
thirds of the crowd there, I think. There was a few people outside standing
back but supporting. Yeah there was a lot of people who I wouldn’t normally
have expected to join in, there there were some very respectable people [ ]
Int: [ ] how could
you tell they were supporting you?
D22: ( ) cheering.
Cheering or chanting from behind. People in buses cheering, bus drivers hooting
[21-5-93]
As we have indicated, one of the
consequences of the pushing and shoving was that the police attempted to arrest
some crowd members. The sense of empowerment which led people to participate in
the pushing, also led them to resist the police reaction. What is more, once
again the sense of empowerment was related to a sense of unity and the
consequential expectation that any crowd member would gain support from others:
D19: There was two
police officers on me had got both of my arms both sides up behind my back, got
me about face and dragged me out obviously arresting me. [ ] I just had the
feeling or the sense that if I shouted out ‘help’ no I’m not gonna passively be
nicked; potentially the situation here where collectively we’ve got the
strength to prevent myself being arrested or anyone else being arrested for
that matter. In the same way that I felt that I had the strength to be able to
move in and try and prevent someone from being physically hurt [ ] I didn’t see
exactly who did it but, those two police officers were instantly removed. Two
or three people leapt onto each police officer (and) literally physically
dragged both police officers off me. [ ] I was free to move so I escaped like
the person I helped earlier
[19-2-93]
(c): Ingroup power and
outgroup vulnerability: This last extract raises a basic point about
power and empowerment: these are not simple properties of any given group but
rather relations (and perceptions of relations) between groups. Thus, the unity
of the protesting crowd served to empower it in relation to the police and
authorities. In the specific case, the strength of the ingroup is a strength to
resist arrest by the outgroup. Hence, in considering empowerment, it is
important to consider not only how strong ingroup members considered themselves
to be, but also how weak they saw the
outgroup to be.
Most of the demonstrators said they
felt that the police were vulnerable once the pushing started. This
vulnerability was a product both of their physical location and of their small
numbers in relation to the crowd:
D8: I think there
was a certain amount of vulnerability there [ ] I think they did feel
vulnerable to the efforts of the crowd [ ] so the police were actually forming
a line in front of an impregnable barrier and, you know, if I was one of them I
wouldn’t fancy being in the situation having like a large degree of people
pushing at me against what effectively is a wall
[25-5-93]
It is worth noting that this
perception was shared between demonstrators and the police. Whereas D23
referred to "the police as severely
under-resourced there", one officer commented that he felt the police
lost control and had to send for reinforcements since "we didn't expect the volume of people there or the trouble"
(P23). When it comes to explaining how new possibilities and new actions arose
in the crowd, it is neither the sense of ingroup strength nor the sense of
outgroup vulnerability alone which are important. It is the combination. It may
be that sometimes demonstrators mention the one and leave the other implicit.
However, sometimes they are explicit in invoking both:
Int: At what point
did your expectation change about what you thought you could do then? I mean
you said initially you went there just to sort of erm
D23: Well I think
as the numbers built up, as we saw it was such a big demonstration and such an
angry demonstration that there was a real feeling of passion about this issue,
that was when I think perceptions changed, yeah.
Int: Did you join
in with the pushing?
D23: Yep.
Int: And what did
you hope to achieve by getting in?
D23: Stop the
council meeting
[ ]
D23: We saw our
opportunity because we saw that the police were so undermanned for the
occasion.
[7-3-93]
To summarise thus far, the analysis
indicates that participants did indeed come to see themselves as more empowered
in the course of events. This sense of empowerment was invoked in explaining
the emergence of new forms of action whereby protestors challenged and resisted
the police. It was also invoked in explaining how the goals of crowd members
became more radical. Empowerment itself was explained as deriving from a sense
of collective unity. This gave the crowd the strength of numbers and made the
police seem vulnerable in comparison. Before going on to analyse how the sense
of unity (and hence of empowerment) was itself produced, it is worth making one
final point which makes such analysis all the more significant. From what our
respondents said, the empowerment that emerged in the events and the new sense
of possibility to which this gave rise did not simply disappear as soon as the
crowd dispersed. As in the examples of ghetto rioters and the French students
of 1968, empowered self-perceptions endured and formed a new starting point for
subsequent forms of collective action:
D11: I mean we were
still on a high for ages afterwards, after doing that we had a fucking great
party that night, everyone was just on a high after doing this and
congratulating ourselves for making a statement in Exeter for once in Exeter's
life
[4-3-93]
Intergroup processes and empowerment
(a) Initial heterogeneity: To trace out the relation of the above evidence of empowerment to
features of the intergroup situation, it is first necessary to indicate what
the demonstrators brought to the event. Not surprisingly, those who had come to
protest against the poll tax that day explained their decision in terms of the
perceived iniquities of the tax. Many opposed the tax in universalist rather
than partisan political terms. In one group discussion, D1 objected to "the unfairness of the system which was
charging everybody the same amount regardless of the size of house".
D2 and D3 assented to this view and D3 added "it seemed to be a moral issue really".
If the
demonstrators agreed on opposition to the Poll tax, they also shared the belief
that all had the right to let their representatives know of their opposition.
This meant not only the right to protest outside but also the right to observe
inside if they so desired:
D23: I think a lot
of people felt very strongly it’s their council they’ve got a right to go and
see it.
[7-3-93]
D9: There was
perhaps a rather naive thought at the start that everyone outside would
actually be allowed to go into the public gallery [ ] and the feeling was well
there’s a constitutional right to go in, there’s a public gallery there, the
meetings are open, we are allowed in [ ] that’s our right to go in
[19-3-93]
However, beyond their right, as an opposition, to be present, there
was little agreement amongst demonstrators - certainly not when it came to the
purpose of their presence. For some, this presence was an end in itself since
it would draw attention to the issues involved around the poll tax. Thus, D8
defined the aim as "just an effort to get publicity for the cause
really". For a small number of others, such as D9 the purpose was more
radical. As he put it: "my aim was
to go into the public gallery and, well, to voice disquiet to put it least and
to disrupt the meeting".
However the heterogeneity of the
crowd was not only a matter of ideas. A number of respondents stressed the
initial lack of unity amongst crowd members: the fact that different types of
people were present and the fact that they kept aloof from each other. D15, for
instance, said of this early stage that "I
think they saw themselves as individuals, I think". D16 gave an even
stronger sense of the barriers that existed within the crowd:
D16: I think in the
beginning people did tend to stand in their own little cliques if you like
[8-3-93]
The term
'clique' clearly signifies exclusivity and difference. What is more, the
psychological distance is reflected in physical distance and lack of
interaction between subgroups in the crowd - something that is confirmed by the
video evidence. At the outset of events then, the protestors cannot be
described as a single category either psychologically or behaviourally and even
physically there was distance between them.
(b) The production of unity: If the demonstrators, despite their heterogeneity, believed that
they had a right to attend the council meeting, then the act of excluding most
people from the town hall was seen by all as illegitimate, irrespective of
whether the individuals themselves had intended to go inside rather than stay
outside. Thus D23, quoted above as saying that protestors felt strongly about
their right to see 'their' council in action, continued by saying that "they were quite surprised and
shocked to be kept out". In most of the interviews, respondents echoed
the notion that 'rights' of attendance rendered exclusion illegitimate . D1,
for instance, expressed his anger that, in a supposedly democratic country where "you should be able to observe
the democratic process going on"
he and fellow protestors had been prevented from doing so. Such a sense
of outrage is also apparent in the contemporaneous comments of demonstrators,
captured on video, as the doors were shut on them:
D4: I thought this
was a council building, is that right?
D5: Public meeting!
Public meeting!
D4: Out of order.
D6: What happened
to democracy?
Most interviewees attributed the beginning of the conflict between police and demonstrators
to what they saw as the illegitimate act of exclusion. These claims are
supported by the video evidence which shows that the more intensive chanting
and the pushing itself began only subsequent to the refusal to admit more than
a small minority to the public gallery. What is more, all those interviewees
who said they participated in the pushing mentioned the denial of their right
to get in as justification for their actions:
Int: Why did you
start pushing and shoving?
D15: Because they
were locking us out. I was aware that some people had got in ( ) I didn’t know
exactly what had happened, what number they’d stopped people going in, but they
[ ] had stopped people going in. And my response to that was that it was that
people had the right to go in. And I suspected that the gallery wasn’t full,
they’d just got scared and I think meetings should be public, accountability (
) and so on. So yeah I was having a little shove there.
[2-4-93]
From a position
in which the crowd was divided into differing groups with different aims, the
common sense of injustice caused by the actions of the authorities led to a
common sense of purpose and therefore common forms of action. We have already
shown how this psychological unity was reflected in forms of interaction and
altruism within the crowd: individuals would even risk arrest to stop fellow
crowd members from being taken by the police. However this interaction was
reflected in more banal (and hence more pervasive) ways as well. People who
hitherto had been in 'cliques' began to chat and joke together. In the process,
psychological unity came to be reflected in the physical unity of the crowd as
well:
D6: I suppose as
well what wasn’t happening so much before was that people were talking to each
other, not just the- I mean, you know, ( ) not just people who knew each other,
but everyone was there together and you could chat to someone next door you’d
never met before in your life and if someone made a joke everyone was going
‘yeah yeah really funny’, you know, whereas before you wouldn’t do that cos you
were just standing around in your own little groups
[28-2-93]
Limits to action
So far we have
established that at least some demonstrators came to feel empowered during the
course of their protest and that this sense of
empowerment can be related to the production of crowd unity caused by their
exclusion from the council meeting. The aim of this final section is to
challenge the Le Bonian assumption that the power of crowds is matched by their
lack of control. Were the demonstrators prepared to do just anything once they
discovered the vulnerability of the authorities in the face of their unity?
Certainly, the authorities themselves perceived that control had been lost and
that, if extreme behaviour had not occurred it could do so at any time. Thus
one police officer (P3) described how "pushin'
and shoving and shouting and kicking started and almost got out of hand".
He went on to emphasise that: "someone
sooner or later was bound to get hurt. Bound to". Other officers were
more specific, expressing their personal fear of what the crowd might do to
them:
P2: I can remember
being crushed against the wall and people surgin' forward and I thought I’m
gonna be squashed here because I could feel the wind being pushed out, it
really was quite frightening. I would say that it was the most frightening
situation I’ve ever been in. Yeah. [ ] Because there was only about six of us
there [ ] it was mayhem that’s all I can describe it as, there was a lot of
pushin' and shovin', they were totally out of control I believe
[21-10-93]
There are three
things to note about these claims. The first is that there is some ambiguity
about the concept 'out of control'. It is not always clear whether officers are
referring to crowd members as being out of police control or as lacking control
over their own behaviour. Indeed the two tend to be conflated in such a way
that the loss of police dominance is equated with the danger of complete social
breakdown. Secondly, we have previously noted that outgroups frequently
perceive crowds as limitlessly violent (Reicher & Potter, 1985). Seeing
them act aggressively without understanding the basis or the constraints upon
that violence, how are outsiders to know if they too might not be targets?
Hence their perceptions of the crowd are dominated by fear (Reicher &
Potter, 1985). This sense of potential danger to the self is quite explicit in
the police accounts. The third point is that, while the officers describe the
imminent danger of destruction and injury (particularly to themselves), they do
not give evidence that such events occurred. Indeed they did not. However
powerful the crowd may have been, their aggression against the police and
others was not taken to extremes.
Crowd members understood their own action to
be operating within clear, collectively defined limits of legitimacy. Some of
those who pushed against police lines mentioned that they felt the crowd was
physically capable of getting in to the building if people were really
determined. However they also explained that they would not entertain just any
actions in order to achieve their ends: while they had a legitimate right to
get in, it would be illegitimate to injure the police in the process. D22
referred to a collective sense that crowd members would not "go around hitting people there",
while D23 used a similar claim to explain why, despite their power, the crowd
didn't simply overwhelm the police and enter the building:
D3: I think it
would have been quite difficult for the police to keep people out if people
were really determined to get in. But that would have meant being quite quite
heavy and physical with the police, and I think most people weren’t really
thinking in those terms
[25-5-93]
This evidence suggests not only that
there were limits to crowd action and that these behavioural limits match
collective notions of legitimacy. If the police were targets of crowd
aggression, there were constraints on the way in which that target would be
attacked: pushing, shoving, shouting were permitted; hitting and trampling were
not. In addition, there were obvious limits to which targets were chosen for
aggression in the first place. The police and council authorities were the
subject of concerted collective attack insofar as their presence and their
actions were considered as illegitimate. No other targets were chosen: adjacent
shops and passers by were completely left alone. This seemed so obvious to the
protestors that it hardly rated a mention. However it is of theoretical
interest in showing that crowds employ their power with considerable
discrimination both in choosing what to attack and how to attack it.
The present
analysis of the behaviours and perceptions of demonstrators in a town hall
anti-poll tax protest has suggested how a sense of self-empowerment can be
understood not simply as a pre-condition of collective action but also as an
emergent product during such action. The sense of empowerment emerged through
the changing nature of crowd members' collective relationship with outgroups
(the police and/or council); the actions of these outgroups served to create a
more inclusive self-categorization for crowd members, which in turn had
implications for expectations of support.
The analysis suggests that many of
the demonstrators came to feel increasingly empowered in the course of the
event: they felt more able to carry out various forms of activity which would
not have happened otherwise, including shouting, pushing against the town hall
doors and mutually resisting arrest. Although the demonstrators began the
demonstration as relatively disparate sub-groups, unity amongst them (beyond
the fact of turning up together at the demonstration itself) was most evident
after most of them had been excluded from the town hall. Demonstrators were
excluded from the meeting of their council wholesale, irrespective of the
different rationales that they had each brought to the demonstration. Since
they now shared the same identity, demonstrators came to expect support from
each other as they acted against this illegitimate exclusion. Moreover, the
perceived impotence of the police qua
an outgroup in the face of their unified action served to encourage the
demonstrators to go further than they may have originally intended in their
actions against the council meeting. Finally, although to outgroup members the
behaviour of the crowd appeared out of control, there were clear, collectively
defined limits to what crowd members did and considered appropriate (e.g., the
reluctance to use violence).
Consistency among interview
responses supports the claim here of a clear pattern in the fact of empowerment
(its commonality within the crowd), the causes of it (support through an
emergent common relationship to outgroups) and its consequences (acting within
shared conceptions of legitimacy). However it is important to stress that, while
evidence of empowerment was to be found in the case of most of the
interviewees, our argument has not been that everyone present on the anti-poll tax demonstration came to feel
more empowered or that all
demonstrations lead to empowerment. Obviously, without knowing the distribution
of prior beliefs about legitimacy, or indeed prior feelings of empowerment, it
is not possible to state whether and how many people will change in any
particular crowd event. The aim of the analysis has been to show that people may become empowered through
participation in collective action and to suggest the conditions under which
this can occur. In particular, individuals will only come to feel empowered
where they perceive both that the ingroup category has become extended and
where this is sufficient to negate the repressive power of the outgroup. These
shifts in categorisation will only occur where the outgroup has different
notions of acceptable action to those in the crowd and where that outgroup acts
to impose its notions so as to produce a common sense of grievance amongst the
ingroup. These conditions may be relatively infrequent. Most crowd events
remain largely consensual and peaceful (Reicher, 1987). Our focus on a
conflictual event is not to perpetuate the dangerous assumption that crowd
events are inherently dangerous but rather because of the theoretical
significance of such conflict.
Of course, as with the work by
Reicher (1996), our theoretical claims are made largely on the basis of post
hoc data and that means the study is open to certain criticisms. First,
since all of the interviews took place after the event itself, memory lapses
were inevitable. Perhaps the main problem with relying so heavily on
retrospective interview data, even with the use of video material as a
supplement, is that of reconstructing the sequence of empowerment - how the
different elements of action and perception might fit together as a whole.
Clearly, a further study of the sequential contributions of such factors as the
outgroup inability to respond and the role of collective support is necessary,
this time using more contemporaneous data. Second, there is the likelihood that
participants' responses might be shaped by a number of strategic
considerations, both in relation to the presentation of the events and in terms
of the interpersonal setting of the interview itself: participants may be
constructing rather than recalling (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992).
While these are potentially serious
epistemological objections, a number of points can be made in defence of this
study. In the first place, the limits of the data must be judged in the light
of the well-documented problems of collecting any data at all on crowd events
(e.g., Adams, 1992; Milgram & Toch, 1969; Wright, 1978). Second, while
there may well have been a number of memory limitations, cognitive biases or
discursive strategies operating in the interviews, the plausibility of the
interview responses as reconstructions of participants' feelings and
motivations at the time is supported by both their consistency with the verbal
material on the video tape and by the extent to which these accounts of
perceptions make sense of the contours and dynamics of the crowd's behaviour.
There is a match between interviewees' accounts of changes in feelings (of
legitimacy and power) and the consensual evidence of ‘escalation’ of the
protest (e.g., trying to push to get in only after being illegitimately
excluded). The value of the present account, like any other, lies in part at
least in its explanatory adequacy to the evidence.
An objection might also be raised
regarding the representativeness of the interview sample. Given that the main
contact source, initially at least, was the local anti-poll tax union, the
people interviewed in this study may have been the more active participants in
the crowd; others may have had a quite different experience. On the other hand,
the relative size of the sample (around 15 per cent of the crowd) tells in the
study's favour; not all the interview sample were involved in the pushing (for
various reasons - some were at the demonstration with small children, for
example). What is more it is worth reiterating that we are not seeking to
establish that everybody became empowered in the crowd but rather that people can
be empowered in the process of interaction and, when they are, this can be
related to shifting intergroup dynamics. Even if 'changers' are
over-represented in our sample, the fact that such change occurs and how it
occurs is sufficient to ground our argument.
The social identity model of crowd
behaviour defines identity as a conception of proper and possible action in
social relations (Reicher, 1996). The model has been developed to show how the
nature of self is not only a social product (as in the typical
self-categorization study; e.g., Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Turner,
Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994), but is also a social producer. This duality flows from the fact that self exists in the
relationships between groups - and sometimes in the overt struggles between
them. It is particularly in situations of crowd conflict (whether ‘violent’ or
not) that the created-creative nature of the self is most apparent - largely
because 'context' is most clearly seen as the actions of the other and hence a
fluid product of intergroup interactions. The present study has been consistent
with the account of Reicher (1996) and Stott (1996) whereby collective action
needs to be grasped in its historically developing intergroup context, where
there may be conflict over what counts as legitimate behaviour (e.g., the right
to get into the town hall) and where there is a difference in the power of each
group to impose its definition. The interaction between conflicting groups may
serve to change each other's social context; this changed context may form the
basis of a changed identity.
This study has provided evidence
that the issue of collective empowerment also needs to be analysed in such a
historical and interactive manner. In so doing it both endorses the growing
interest in power as a key mediator of collective action and simultaneously
challenges the static manner in which power has been conceptualised. The study
also provides further support for the elaborated social identity model of crowd
behaviour while at the same time suggesting some further extensions. In
particular, it further underlines the point that power must be conceptualised
as a social relation rather than a group attribute. Thus what is important is
not only the way in which unity provides strength to the ingroup but also how
the outgroup is rendered vulnerable as a result. Power refers to the relative
ability of each group to impose itself on the other and constitute the context
in its own terms.
On a more general level, our aim
here has been to add to the rehabilitation of crowds within psychology - to
show that their action is not just meaningful but also creative. Crowds produce
change. It is therefore worth stressing that the change brought about during
the events we described was not just confined to those events. We have noted
how at least some crowd members report that they joined subsequent protests
with an enhanced sense of what they were capable of achieving and with a
greater sense of the vulnerability of the 'authorities' rather than their own.
This extended to quite different actions such as refusing to pay the poll tax
and a willingness to challenge the law. As D15 put it: "it made me feel braver I suppose".
Theoretically, this only goes to
underline the importance of our general approach. Not only might crowd members'
sense of empowerment develop during crowd events but also the point which they
start from may be the result of prior experience in crowds. Methodologically,
it shows that studies of single events are inevitably limited. A properly
historical study should look not only at developments within a single events
but also the development over multiple level campaigns. In both senses, this
study shows the necessity to make the investigation of social psychological
constructs such as power more
historical. It also shows the value of using the crowd as a domain in
which to investigate that history.
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[1] A full version of the interview schedule is available from the
authors.
[2] The fact that at least some of this food was vegetarian seemed
particularly to enrage councillors and indicate the disreputable nature of the
protestors. One councillor made specific reference to the fact that the Cornish
pasties had no meat in them and therefore were as inauthentic and alien to the
area (Cornwall being adjacent to Devon of which Exeter is the county town) as
those who threw them.
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