The role of desires and anticipated emotions in goal-directed behaviours
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The role of desires and anticipated
emotions in goal-directed behaviours: Broadening and deepening the theory of
planned behaviour
Perugini, Marco; Bagozzi, Richard
P. (2001) The British Journal of
Social Psychology, 40, 79-98.
Abstrak
Building on the theory
of planned behaviour (TPB), we develop a new model of purposive behaviour which
suggests that desires are the proximal causes of intentions, and the
traditional antecedents in the TPB work through desires. In addition, perceived
consequences of goal achievement and goal failure are modelled as anticipated
emotions, which also function as determinants of desires. The new model is
tested in two studies: an investigation of bodyweight regulation by 108
Italians at the University of Rome and an investigation of effort expended in
studying by 122 students at the University of Rome. Frequency and recency of
past behaviour are controlled for in tests of hypotheses. The findings show
that desires fully mediated the effects of attitudes, subjective norms,
perceived behavioural control and anticipated emotions on intentions.
Significantly greater amounts of variance are explained in intentions and
behaviour by the new model in comparison to the TPB and variants of the TPB
that include either anticipated emotions and/or past behaviour.
Headnote
The origin of
action--its efficient, not its final cause--is choice, and that of choice is
desire and reasoning with a view to an end.
Aristole (Nicomachean
Ethics, 1139a 31-2)
The theory of reasoned
action (TRA) has been a mainstay in social psychology for many years (Fishbein
& Ajzen, 1975). One advantage of the theory is its parsimony, so it is
understandable that changes have occurred infrequently. Perhaps the most
important revision of the TRA has been the introduction of perceived
behavioural control (PBC) with the theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen,
1991). The approach taken by Ajzen with this revision was to add an independent
variable as a parallel predictor of the dependent variables, along with
established predictors. The idea is that more variance can be accounted for by
specifying processes formally contained in error terms in tests of the theory.
This general approach might be characterized as theory broadening.
A second approach to
the revision of any theory is to introduce a variable that explains how
existing predictors function to influence intentions. The idea is that certain
theoretical mechanisms can be better understood and their effects better
qualified by introducing a new construct that mediates or moderates the effects
of existing variables. This general approach might be characterized as theory
deepening. This study presents a model that expands and deepens the TPB by
introducing new constructs which recently have been shown to play important
roles in decisionmaking. Figure 1 presents our model, which we term the model
of goal-directed behaviour (MGB) for expository purposes.
The MGB posits that
desires provide the direct impetus for intentions and transform the
motivational content to act embedded in attitudes towards the act (Aact),
anticipated emotions (AE), subjective norms (SN) and PBC. Frequency of past
behaviour is further assumed to be a predictor of desires, intentions and
behaviour, whereas recency of past behaviour predicts behaviour only. As argued
below, the introduction of anticipated emotions broadens the TPB by including
new decision criteria with respect to a person's goals. The incorporation of
desires deepens the TPB by reinterpreting how existing antecedents in the
theory function. The inclusion of frequency and recency of past behaviour
allows the researcher to incorporate information concerning automatic aspects of
goal-directed behaviours not reflected in the variables included in the TPB.
Derivation of the MGB
The TPB seeks to
account for actions and maintains that these are a direct function of
behavioural intentions (BI) and PBC, and indirect functions, through BI, of
Aact, SN and PBC.
A recent meta-analysis examined 142 empirical tests of the TPB
and found that the TPB accounted on average for 40 % of the variance in
intention and 29 % of the variance in behaviour (Armitage & Conner, in press). Although there is little question
that the TPB offers a parsimonious account of purposive behaviour, its
sufficiency can be questioned. Researchers recently proposed additions to the
TPB that address self-identity processes (Sparks & Shephard, 1992), moral
norms (Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995), the
distinction between perceptions of control and self-efficacy (Armitage &Conner, 1999; Terry & O'Leary, 1995), and
anticipated emotions (AEs; e.g. Parker et al., 1995; Richard, van der Pligt,
& de Vries, 1995).
We also propose that
the TPB can be improved by adding predictors to it. Specifically, we posit that
AEs function as important antecedents in decision-making processes. An early
consideration of AEs was done by Parker et al. (1995) who found that
anticipated regret (measured with `make me feel sorry' and `make me feel good'
items) tempered behavioural expectations that one would commit certain
automotive driving violations. Likewise, Richard et al. (1995) found that
negative AEs (called anticipated post-behavioural affective reactions and
measured with `worried-not worried', `regret-no regret' and `tense-relaxed'
items) increased expectations that people would refrain from sexual intercourse
or would use condoms in casual encounters.
A question that can be
raised about attempts to introduce AEs into the TPB is whether the
conceptualization of AEs and its measures overlap with Aact and its measures.1
Our theoretical specification and empirical measurement of AEs differ
fundamentally from the specification and measurement of both Aact and AEs as
proposed heretofore. Consider first Aact. Attitude is conceived as 'a
psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with
some degree of favor or disfavor' (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 1, emphasis in
original removed). Under the TRA and TPB, Aact is formulated to refer to a
target behaviour and is measured by such bipolar semantic differential items as
good-bad, harmful-beneficial, rewardingpunishing, and unpleasant-pleasant
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, pp. 261-262). The psychological tendency embodied
by an attitude is sometimes termed an `acquired behavioural disposition'
(Campbell, 1963). Acquisition of an attitude is thought to be primarily via
learning, although biological bases are sometimes acknowledged as well (Eagly
& Chaiken, 1993, p. 3).
The nature and role of
AEs we introduce differ from that entailed by Aact in attitude theories in
three main respects, and concern the referent, underlying process and
measurement of attitudes, respectively. First, Aact under the TRA and TPB
focuses upon what one does or can do, whereas our specification of AEs focuses
not upon action, but rather upon achievement of personal goals. Heretofore,
researchers have taken one approach or the other. Under the TRA and TPB,
actions are the referents for all antecedents. Indeed, goals are purposefully
excluded from the theories (e.g. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, pp. 29-30, 111;
Fishbein & Stasson, 1990, p. 177). An alternative approach was taken by
Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and Pieters (1998) who argued that people, when
deliberating to act or not in goal-directed situations, take into account the
emotional consequences of both achieving and not achieving a sought after goal
(cf. Parker et al., 1995; Richard et al., 1995). In both cases, the processes
are believed to be predicated upon a type of thought process analogous to
counterfactual thinking, but perhaps better termed `prefactual appraisals'
(Gleicher et al. 1995), whereby a decisionmaker imagines the affective
consequences of goal attainment and goal failure before deciding to perform
instrumental acts. Bagozzi et al. (1998) identified 17 emotions (7 positive, 10
negative: see Method below) that influenced intentions to diet and exercise, in
the service of losing or maintaining one's body weight. Unlike Bagozzi et al.
(1998), who only considered goal criteria, we also incorporate the TPB and
therefore include action referents in our integrative approach.
A second difference
between our model and the TPB, beyond divergence in referents, concerns the
theoretical processes underlying the effects of Aact vs. AEs. As a disposition
to respond in a favourable or unfavourable manner, Aact arises through
learning, whereby a person acquires a reaction to an object or action over a
period of time or through repeated contact accompanied by reinforcement. An
attitude is an evaluative response towards an object or act that, once learned,
is triggered automatically when one is exposed to the object or act or thinks
about it (Fazio, 1995). By contrast, the processes behind the functioning of
AEs are more dynamic and entail self-regulation in response to feedback
(Bagozzi, 1992; Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998). That is, one first has a
goal, then appraises the consequences of achieving and not achieving that goal,
with corresponding positive and negative emotions arising. An attitude is
typically constant over reasonable periods of time and is not formulated as a
response contingent on the occurrence of particular happenings to be appraised.
The proposed functioning of AEs is, in contrast, specifically contingent on
one's appraisal of goal achievement/goal failure, which changes from time to
time, depending on the context. An implicit comparison is made between one's
goal as a standard or reference value and achieving and failing to achieve that
goal, with anticipated emotions as consequences. Attitudes do not function in
this manner but are more disposition-like responses to a fixed object or act.
A third distinction we
wish to make between Aact and AEs occurs at the level of measurement. When
people are asked to respond with their attitudes, they are forced to make a
choice of favourability or unfavourability. This is a consequence of the common
practice of using bipolar items to indicate respondents' attitudes. By
contrast, for the measurement of AEs, we argue that it is important to use
unipolar items (e.g. the experience of excitement along a `not at all' to `very
much' continuum). In a study of affect, Bagozzi, Wong, and Yi (1999) found that
positive and negative affect can be positively or negatively related (or
unrelated) to each other, depending on the circumstances. This finding is in
line with related evidence for basic differences between positive and negative
emotional reactions, in terms of static structural representations of affect
(Russell & Barrett, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), basic functioning
of physiological systems (e.g. Davidson, 1992; Gray, 1990), behavioural
strategies (Carver & White, 1994; Higgins, 1996), anticipation of future
consumption (Lowenstein, 1987), decision-making (van der Pligt, Zeelenberg, van
Dijk, de Vries, & Richard, 1998) and effects on behaviour (Cacioppo &
Bernston, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999). To use a bipolar
scale to measure emotions (as is done in attitude theory) would make positive
and negative affect mutually exclusive by definition and not permit respondents
the opportunity to express their differential relevance. Previous research found
that positive and negative anticipated emotions are positively correlated yet
clearly differentiated .50; Bagozzi et al., 1998).2
In summary, one type
of revision to the TPB proposed herein adds AEs as parallel predictors along
with the traditional independent variables found in the TPB. Whereas the TPB
specifies that action is the target referent of all independent variables,
defines Aact as a disposition-like tendency to respond favourably or
unfavourably towards the action, and uses bipolar items to measure Aact, our
specification of AEs stipulates that the referents of AEs are personal goals,
AEs function as independent variables based upon a decision process that takes
into account judged consequences of goal achievement and goal failure, and AEs
are measured as unipolar reactions.
A second revision of
the TPB is related to the introduction of a variable explaining how existing
predictors influence intentions. It has been argued that the TPB fails to
consider how intentions become energized (Bagozzi, 1992; Calder & Ross,
1973, p. 7; Fazio, 1995, pp. 271-272). Attitudes, SN and PBC provide reasons
for acting, it is claimed, but do not incorporate explicit motivational content
needed to induce an intention to act. Similar to Gollwitzer's designation for
wants and wishes in his action phases model (e.g. Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, &
Steller, 1990, p. 1119), Bagozzi (1992, pp. 184-6) proposed that desires
provide the motivational impetus for intentions and suggested that Aact, SN and
PBC work through desires enroute to influencing intentions.' This happens in
one of two ways. With volitive desires (Davis, 1984a), Aact, SN and PBC provide
reasons for acting that a decisionmaker takes into account to form a
self-commitment to act. Some philosophers maintain that desires have a
particular kind of relationship to intentions in the sense that, once one is
aware of and accepts his or her desire to act, this will motivate him or her to
form an intention. Davis (1984b, p. 53) calls this the `connection condition'
for intentions. With appetitive desires (Davis, 1984a), Aact, SN and PBC serve
as catalysts to release or free-up a hidden or latent desire related to such
biological needs as food or sex, in contrast to their arousing function for
volitive desires (Bagozzi, 1992). Some empirical support for the role of
volitive desires in decisionmaking has been found in the contexts of
exercising, dieting and studying (Bagozzi & Edwards, 1998; Bagozzi &
Kimmel, 1995; Leone, Perugini, & Ercolani,
1999). In the MGB, however, the target behaviour is instrumental to goal
achievement. Thus, the specification of desire is relative to performance of a
given behaviour (e.g. dieting) because it is conducive to goal attainment (e.g.
body-weight regulation). This motivational stance is often referred to in the
philosophical literature as the functioning of an extrinsic desire, that is 'a
desire for something for its believed conduciveness to something else that one
desires' (Mele, 1995, p. 391).
Thus, desires
represent the motivational state of mind wherein appraisals and reasons to act
are transformed into a motivation to do so. This motivation or desire is
hypothesized as the most proximal determinant of intentions in the MGB.
A final shortcoming of
the TPB is that past behaviour is not incorporated in the model. Ajzen (1991)
criticized the use of past behaviour on grounds that it offers no explanatory
content, although he allowed that past behaviour provides a methodological
control in tests of any theory: '... past behaviour can be used to test the
sufficiency of any model designed to predict future behavior' (p. 202).
Furthermore, he argued that the inclusion of PBC in the TPB should preclude the
need for past behaviour, in that PBC should mediate any residual effects of
past behaviour. However, recent empirical work finds that past behaviour still
predicts intentions and/or behaviour in tests of the TPB (e.g. Ajzen &
Driver, 1992; Bagozzi & Kimmel, 1995; Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Leone, Perugini, & Ercolani, 1999; Norman & Conner, 1996; Norman & Smith, 1995).
The question remains
what the effects of past behaviour might represent. A recent meta-analysis
examined 64 studies and found robust evidence for the impact of frequency of
past behaviour on both intentions and future behaviours (Ouellette & Wood,
1998). The authors proposed two processes through which frequency of past
behaviour guides future behaviour. When a behaviour is well-practised in a
constant environment, frequency of past behaviour reflects habit strength and
has therefore a direct effect on future behaviour. However, when behaviours are
not well-learned or when they are performed in unstable contexts, frequency of
past behaviour contributes directly to intentions because `people are likely to
form favourable intentions about acts they have frequently performed in the
past' (Ouellette & Wood, 1998, p. 56). The latter rationale may also be
extended to the direct effects of frequency of past behaviour on desires. In
both cases, a reasonable assumption is that not all desires or intentions are
explicitly formed consciously or well-formed (e.g. Bagozzi & Yi, 1989;
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Another proposal has been to partition the
effects of past behaviour into frequency and recency effects (e.g. Bagozzi
& Warshaw, 1990). Although seemingly related, frequency and recency effects
are conceptually distinct and therefore might carry independent information.
For instance, one may have a long history of performing a given behaviour
without having performed it recently (e.g. a person who long ago gave up
purchasing lottery tickets, after experiencing a string of frustrated hopes),
or one may have recently taken up an activity with no prior experience with it
(e.g. a first-time skier).
Recency of behaviour
performance should influence future behaviour to the degree that availability
and anchoring/adjustment biases occur in information processing (e.g. Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974) and to the degree that an activity, whether established
or not, has been recently initiated. The recent initiation of an activity may
carry implicit information about intentions over and above the degree to which
intentions are accessible to conscious awareness (Bargh & Barndollar, 1996;
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Verplanken, Aarts, & van Knippenberg, 1997).
Recency may serve as an indirect indicator that an intention has been activated
and therefore be positively associated with subsequent performance of the
behaviour.
To recap, we postulate
a new model, the MGB, by proposing revisions to the TPB based upon the addition
of new independent variables, the introduction of a mediating variable, and
explicit provision for control of past behaviour. We added AEs and past
behaviour to the TPB as co-predictors along with Aact, SN and PBC. Desires were
hypothesized to provide the motivational impetus channelling the effects of the
predictors on intentions. The sufficiency of desires as mediators were tested
explicitly by formally comparing the model in Fig. 1 to a model where the
above-mentioned antecedents also have direct effects on intentions. The present
study tested the MGB in two field settings: losing/maintaining body weight and
increasing/maintaining efforts at studying.
Method
Participants and procedure
In Study 1, 108
students (63 women and 45 men, mean age = 22.0, SD = 6.6) at the University of
Rome participated in a longitudinal study concerning body weight regulation. In
Study 2, 122 students (56 women and 66 men, mean age = 20.5, SD = 3.5) at the
University of Rome were asked to participate in an investigation concerning studying.
All participants were contacted individually. At Phase 1, participants provided
background information, including a statement on their body weight/studying
goals. They were asked to write the initials of their names on the
questionnaire and were assured of anonymity. Participants in Study 1 were
asked: `Which of the following statements best expresses your personal goal
over the next four weeks?' The alternatives were: (1) 'I want to decrease my
body weight over the next four weeks', (2) 'I want to stay at the same body
weight over the next four weeks' (3) 'I want to increase my body weight over
the next four weeks'; and (4) 'I do not have a goal with respect to my body
weight'. Participants in Study 2 were asked: `Which of the following statements
best expresses your personal goal over the next four weeks?' The alternatives
were: (1) 'I want to decrease my studying effort over the next four weeks'; (2)
'I want to stay at the same level of effort for studying over the next four
weeks; (3) 'I want to increase my studying effort over the next four weeks';
and (4) 'I do not have a goal with respect to my studying effort'. Participants
who chose (1) or (2) in Study 1 and (2) or (3) in Study 2 were asked to answer
questions worded in accordance with their selected goal for AEs, PBC, Aact, SN,
desires, BI and past behaviour. Four weeks later, participants were recontacted
and asked to answer a questionnaire containing measures of instrumental
behaviours used to achieve their goals.' To minimize the chances for across
time self-presentational and consistency biases, participants were not told at
Phase 1 that they would be contacted at a later time.
Measures5
Choice of instrumental
behaviour. Whereas in Study 1 two instrumental behaviours (dieting and
exercising) were examined for each respondent, participants in Study 2 were
asked to choose their own preferred instrumental behaviour. Five behaviours
were listed on the questionnaire, and participants were asked to choose one of
them or to provide a different one if they so preferred. The five behaviours
were selected based on a pilot study (Leone, 1995). The five instrumental
behaviours were `stick to a fixed daily schedule', `avoid any type of
distractions', `study in a placid place', `refrain from doing anything but
studying in the afternoon' and `choose a quiet environment'. Respondents chose
the instrumental acts in the following respective proportions: 27.9 %, 19.7 %,
18.0 %, 6.6 % and 11.5 %, respectively. Other behaviours not on the list were
chosen by 16.3 % of the participants. With this procedure, we wished to be as
certain as possible that the instrumental behaviours were those that
participants considered personally relevant to reach their goals. Participants
were asked to write their selected instrumental behaviour in a box at the top
of each remaining page of the questionnaire. The rest of the questionnaire
referred to the chosen instrumental behaviour as `Activity X'.
Anticipated emotions.
Anticipated emotions in Study 1 were measured on 11-point items, with response
alternatives from `not at all' to `very much'. For the positive emotions,
participants were asked to express the felt intensity of each emotion expressed
in the subjunctive conditional: `If I succeed to achieve my goal of [decreasing
my body weight, staying at the same body weight] over the next four weeks, I
will feel [excited, delighted, happy, glad, satisfied, proud, self-assured].'
The wording for the negative emotions was: `If I do not succeed to achieve my
goal of [decreasing my body weight, staying at the same body weight] over the
next four weeks, I will feel [angry, frustrated, guilty, ashamed, sad,
disappointed, depressed, worried, uncomfortable, fearful]'. Similar wording was
used in Study 2 for `increasing my studying effort [staying at the same level
of studying effort]'.
Attitudes. Attitudes
were assessed for each behaviour in similar ways in both studies. For example,
the dieting item began: 'I think that to keep to a diet in order to decrease my
body weight [stay at the same body weight] during the next four weeks is...'
Participants responded to 11 semantic differential items on 7-point scales,
defined by the pairs useless-useful, ineffective-effective,
disadvantageous-advantageous, stupid-intelligent, punishing-rewarding, foolish-wise,
unpleasant-pleasant, joyless-joyful, boring-exciting, unattractive-attractive,
and unenjoyable-enjoyable.
Subjective norms.
Participants were asked to `List the three most important persons for you and
indicate how much each of them would approve or disapprove of you doing
physical exercise in order to decrease your body weight [stay at the same body
weight] during the next four weeks'. Each response was measured on a 7-point
scale anchored by 'disapprove' and 'approve'. Similar items were used for dieting
and studying. We used these items in order to provide multiple measures but
acknowledge that this could introduce error to the extent that they are not
highly correlated with the traditional direct way of measuring SN.
Perceived behavioural
control. This variable was measured with three items for each instrumental
behaviour. For example, the first item for dieting was, 'How much control do
you have over keeping to a diet in order to decrease your body weight [stay at
the same body weight] during the next four weeks', followed by an 11-point
scale going from 'no control' to 'full control'. The second item was, 'For me
to keep to a diet during the next four weeks in order to decrease my body
weight [stay at the same body weight] is...', followed by an 11-point scale
from 'difficult' to 'e2sv'. Finally, the third item asked participants to
respond on an 11-point scale from 'very unlikely' to 'very likely' to the
following statement: 'If I wanted to, it would be easy for me to keep to a diet
during the next four weeks in order to decrease my body weight [stay at the
same body weight].' Analogous items were used to measure PBC for exercising.
For studying, only the second and third items were used.
Desire. Desires were
measured by three items for each instrumental behaviour. For physical exercise,
the three items were: (1) 'I desire to do physical exercise in the next four
weeks in order to decrease by body weight [stay at the same body weight]',
followed by an 11-point scale anchored by 'false' and 'true'; (2) `My desire
for doing physical exercise in the next four weeks in order to decrease by body
weight [stay at the same body weight] can be described as...', where
participants selected one of the following: (a) `no desire', (b) `very weak
desire', (c) `weak desire', (d) `moderate desire', (e) `strong desire', and (f)
`very strong desire'; and (3) 'I want to do physical exercise in the next four
weeks in order to decrease my body weight [stay at the same body weight]',
followed by an 11-point scale from 'false' to 'true'. Similar items were
employed for dieting. For studying, only the first and third items were used.
Intentions. Intentions
were indicated by three items. For example, the item measuring dieting plans
was, 'I am planning to keep to a diet in order to decrease my body weight [stay
at the same body weight] during the next four weeks', followed by a 7-point
scale with 'very unlikely', 'unlikely', 'somewhat unlikely', `neither unlikely
nor likely', `somewhat likely', 'likely' and `very likely' as response
alternatives. For intentions, the item read, 'I intend to keep to a diet in
order to decrease my body weight [stay at the same body weight] during the next
four weeks'. Responses were measured on a 7-point scale anchored by `completely
disagree' and `completely disagree' and 'completely agree'. Finally, for
effort, the item read, 'I will expend effort on dieting to decrease my body
weight stay at the same body weight [stay at the same body weight] during the
next four weeks', and a 7-point scale going from `completely disagree' to
`completely agree' was used to record responses. Parallel items were used to
measure intentions to exercise and to study.
Past behaviour
frequenct and recency). The measure of frequency was: 'How often did you do
physical exercise during the past year to decrease your body weight [stay at
the same body weight]?' Participants answered on a 7-point scale with 'never',
'almost never', 'a very few times, 'occasionally', 'often', ,quite often' and
'very many times'. For recency, the item read, 'How often did you do physical
exercise during the past four weeks to decrease your body weight [stay at the
same body weight] ?', where responses were recorded by a 5-point scale with
'never', 'sometimes', 'regularly', 'often' and 'always' as alternatives.
Similar items were used to assess frequency and recency for dieting and for
studying.
Behavior. In Phase 2,
participants were re-contacted and asked to respond to the following items,
depending on the study they were in: 'In order to decrease by body weight [stay
at the same body weight], I have done physical exercise during the previous four
weeks.; In order to decrease my body weight [stay at the same body weight], I
have kept to a diet during the previous four weeks'; and 'In order to increase
my studying effort [stay at the same studying effort], I have done [Activity X]
during the previous four weeks'. Five-point scales were used in all cases, with
'never', sometimes', 'regularly', 'often' and 'always' as response
alternatives.
Data analysis
Specific information
concerning the statistical analyses which have been used for the two studies
are given in the Results section.
In both studies,
Structural Equations Models (SEM) with LISREL 8 were used to test the relevant
statistical models (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993). The goodness-of-fit of the
models was evaluated with the chi-square test, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI),
the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA). Satisfactory fits are obtained when the chi-square test is
non-significant, but given the dependence of the chi-square test on sample
size, and the need for fit indices normed from 0 to 1, the other indices were
examined as well. Good fits are obtained when the CFI and TLI are greater than
or equal to .90 and the RMSEA is less than or equal to .08. Further discussion
of goodness-of-fit issues can be found in Bentler (1990), Marsh, Balla, and Hau
(1996) and Steiger (1990). Note further that the TLI and RMSEA indices reward
for model parsimony and penalise for model complexity.
Alternative models
were compared with chi-square difference tests for nested models and with the
other fit indices for non-nested models. In addition, key parameters were
compared and R' values inspected to learn about the predictive power of the
alternative models and the sufficiency of desires.
Results
Because Study 1 employed
separate measures of two instrumental acts, we examined hypotheses separately
for the acts and also for a summary model where exercising and dieting were
treated as first-order factors loading on a single second-order factor that can
be interpreted as a latent representation of general means to body-weight
control. A three-step strategy for analysis was employed beginning with
principal components analysis, followed by higher-order confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA), and ending with hierarchical regression analysis. The analyses
supported our decision to consider the summary model and refer to the specific
acts only when statistically significant differences were present. A complete
description of the procedures and the findings are available on request from
the authors, but is not presented here in the interest of brevity.
Predictions under the
proposed MGB were largely supported. Desires, in particular, mediated the
effects of the antecedents on intentions in both studies. These findings not only
suggest that the TPB is insufficient for explaining intentions, but the results
imply that the mechanism behind the effects of the predictors are more complex
than hypothesized under the TPB. Desires apparently provide sufficient impetus
for intention formation and channel the effects of the antecedents. In this
sense, desires constitute important motivators in decision-making. At the same
time, desires were found to be functions of AEs and the independent variables
specified under the TPB, as qualified below.
By the same token, the
MGB accounted for significantly more variance in intentions to diet, exercise
and study than the TPB. In this sense, the MGB meets Ajzen's (1991, p. 199)
criterion for revising the TPB:
... the theory of
planned behavior is, in principle, open to the inclusion of additional
predictors if it can be shown that they capture a significant proportion of the
variance in intention or behavior after the theory's current variables have
been taken into account.
However, in addition
to prediction, the MGB refines the explanatory mechanisms underlying intention
formation. Desires are hypothesized to provide the direct impetus for
intentions and to convey the effects of Aact, SN, AEs and PBC on intentions. It
might be argued that the gain in prediction by the MGB comes at the expense of
parsimony afforded by the TPB. However, as can be seen in Figs 2 and 3, the
explained variance in intentions is owing to desires, and not Aact, SN, AEs and
PBC. A model with only desires as antecedents to intentions would be in fact
both more parsimonious and predictive than the TPB. Of course, to understand
the basis for desires, the MGB provides insight and introduces antecedents
based on both action and goal consequences and thus is more explanatory.
Therefore, we believe
that the MGB represents a substantial improvement over the TPB, while retaining
its key concepts. Should one abandon the TPB? We believe this would be
premature for a number of reasons. First, the TPB has been supported by many
studies, whereas the MGB is new. More evidence should be produced before one
considers abandoning the TPB or accepting the MGB. Second, the MGB was
developed to apply to decision-making where behaviours are performed with the
manifest purpose to reach a specific goal. Thus, the addition of AEs injects
explicit content into the TPB that takes into account the importance or
implications of a goal to which an act is contributory. By contrast, the
antecedents under the TPB focus on the act as referents and not its specific
goal consequences. On the other hand, for target acts or behaviours that are
performed as ends in and of themselves (e.g. exercising for pure kinaesthetic
pleasure), we would anticipate that the TPB would predict intentions as well as
the MGB. One could speculate that the TPB works best when actions are ends, and
the MGB provides the biggest improvement when actions are means to end-state
goals. More research is needed to verify these speculations and discover other
boundary conditions under which the theories apply.
A number of
differences between the findings in Studies 1 and 2 should be mentioned.
Positive, but not negative, AEs predicted desires to exercise and diet in Study
1 ; but negative, and not positive, AEs predicted desires to study in Study 2.
What could account for these differences? Why should desires to exercise and
diet be driven by the positive consequences of goal attainment, and studying be
driven by the negative consequences of goal failure? One possibility is the
different contexts and their meaning for approach and avoidance goals (cf.
Carver & White, 1994; Higgins, 1996; Leone, Bagozzi, & Perugini,2000). Consider first, losing and maintaining one's body weight:
losing and maintaining weight are concrete goals. Likewise, the connection or
linkage between these concrete goals and other concrete or higher level ends
(e.g. fit into clothes better, look good, feel good, boost selfesteem, enhance
health, promote one's social life) are readily inferred (e.g. Bagozzi &
Edwards, 1998). Moreover, losing or maintaining body weight is conceived with
relatively high likelihood to lead to other concrete and higher-order ends and
to do so in a relatively short period of time, compared to studying (see
below). As a consequence, losing and maintaining body weight, at least for
people most able to do so (e.g. students), may come to be seen primarily as
approachable goals and associated with positive emotions. The negative
consequences of not losing or maintaining one's body weight may not be
sufficiently strong for students in order to stimulate a desire to engage in
goal-directed behaviours. Furthermore, the end states which most likely are
associated with the goal concern ideal aspects of the self, especially in an
Italian context. According to Higgins (1996; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman,
1997), the presence of an ideal regulatory focus should be associated with an
approach strategy and with accentuated importance of positive affect. To
increase or maintain one's studying efforts, however, may be less easy to
conceive, and in any case the perceived connection between such goals and
higher-level ends (e.g. lead to a high paying, challenging career) are weak in
Italian society. Furthermore, such consequences are further removed in time
than consequences of losing or maintaining one's body weight. Moreover,
studying is likely to be viewed, in an Italian context, not as a goal of
intrinsic worth, but rather as something which ought to be done. The prevalence
of an ought focus should be associated with an avoidance strategy and with an
accentuated role played by negative affect such as guilt, shame or anxiety.
Further research should focus on deeper investigations of the relation between
anticipated emotions, regulatory focuses and behavioural strategies.
An area in need of
future research is specification of how self-caused and circumstances-caused
factors are taken into account in decisionmaking with respect to goals. We
focused herein on the emotional implications of self-caused goal achievement
and goal failure as outcomes. However, in addition to these aspects of
purposive behaviour, it is important to take into account cases when a plan is
progressing well or poorly, when subgoals have been achieved or thwarted, when
expectations in the likelihood of goal attainment change (e.g. Oatley, 1992, p.
48), and when personality styles related to confidence, doubt and coping, and
happenings beyond one's control, occur that facilitate or inhibit goal
attainment.
Finally, the present
study leaves open the question of whether other explanatory variables can be
introduced between intention and behaviour. To the extent that a particular
behaviour constitutes a goal in the mind of a decisionmaker, a number of
variables can be suggested as possibilities for future study. For example,
implementation intentions, planning, decisions with respect to means and
related criteria dealing with the monitoring of progress towards goal
attainment and the maintenance of commitment to goal pursuit are processes that
might be examined, given that recent research into goal-directed behaviours has
found that these variables influence action (e.g. Bagozzi, 1992; Bagozzi &
Edwards, 1998, 2000; Gollwitzer &
Schaal, 1998; Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran, 1997).
Acknowledgements The
authors wish to express their gratitude to the editor and anonymous reviewers
for comments made on an earlier draft of this paper.
Footnote
1. This issue was
raised by an anonymous reviewer and the editor, to whom we are grateful. See
alsoConner and Armitage (1998).
2 Note that negative
antipaticated emotions to failures and postive refer to success in achieving a
goal, A positive correlation therefore is what one would normally expect.
For empical and
therical evidence about the distinction between desire and intention see, among
others
4 In Study 1, 60 % of
all respondents (N = 200) had specific body weight goals and were included in
the study, for a sample of 120. At Phase 2 we were able to contact 90 % of this
sample, thus yielding 108 people for study. Every participant contacted at
Phase 2 agreed to participate. In Study 2, 70 % of the sample of 185 initially
contacted had a goal for studying. At Phase 2, we were able to contact about 95
% of the sample of 130 people who expressed a goal to increase their effort or
keep the same effort for studying, thus yielding 122 people for study. Every
participant contacted at Phase 2 agreed to participate.
' Studies 1 and 2 were
conducted in Italy and the questionnaire presented in Italian. The Italian
versions are available on request.
' A measurement model
without this first item of intentions was tested as well. The fit in fact was
better (X2(111) = 145.38, p = .02; CFI = .97, TLI = .95, RMSEA = .051), and the
loadings of the two remaining items were also higher (.96 and .67) and reliability
increased (.81). However, the differences were not dramatic, and the
conservative decision was taken to retain the first measure of intentions.
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